The Contested Ethics of Democracy Promotion by Kurki, Milja
This chapter explores the ethical justifications actors in international politics may have to promote democracy in other countries. Although ethical debates surrounding the promotion of democracy often remain rather implicit, this chapter seeks to show that it is not irrelevant for our understanding of the practice, or for the practitioners themselves, to think through more carefully the ethical underpinnings that do actually and potentially and could frame this policy agenda. Paying attention to the ethics of democracy promotion is significant not least because we observe that a variety of differing, and contested, ethical assumptions and frameworks can be used to frame the activity by different actors, organizsations, and political groups.
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This chapter examines the ethical justifications as to why we might wish to engage in the promotion of democracy in other countries today. Specifically, the aim is to engage in reflection on the ethics of international democracy promotion in the context of recent debates over the contested nature of democracy as a concept.
This angle of investigation is interesting for at least two reasons. First, despite the confidence of many democracy promoters in acting in democracy’s defencse globally, it is not self-evident what is ethically good about democracy and whether and why it should be promoted. Even within the currently dominant liberal frames of democracy, there are many unresolved questions about the nature, the purpose, and the legitimacy of the policy of promoting democracy. We will also observe that if we pay close attention to alternative, non- (or rather “extra”-) liberal democratic traditions, even more troublesome questions over ethics of democracy promotion arise, for with contested notions of democracy come also contested ethical frames as to how we should evaluate, judge, and practisce democracy promotion.
Despite the interesting and tricky nature of “ethics” in democracy promotion, curiously ethical questions are often sidelined in democracy promotion policy practice today. This is arguably due to the embeddedness in this policy agenda of certain kinds of ethical and conceptual frames that are more often than not liberal or neoliberal. These frames remain implicit because they operate within an increasingly “technical” or “depoliticizsed” democracy promotion discourse.
We must therefore start by examining current policy practice, to understand how democracy promotion is conceived of today, and why, and how, ethical debate fits (or does not fit) within it. The first section will introduce democracy promotion, or “democracy support” as it is currently known, and will address three aspects of current policy practice: (1) the increasing depoliticizsation of democracy promotion; (2) the often implicit “liberal consensus” on democracy in its promotion; and (3) the shifts towards “local ownership” in the policy agenda. While each trend can be seen as a response to the critics of “classical” democracy promotion, we also see that ethical questions fit with considerable difficulty into current policy practices.
In the second part we consider the ethics of democracy support explicitly and in the context of debates around its contested nature. I discuss first the dominant liberal ethical frame and questions it raises. I then discuss a number of alternative conceptual and ethical frames we might consider. How do social democrats, radical democrats, global democrats, and “post--humanist” democrats, for example, consider democracy and the ethics of its promotion? The chapter seeks to argue that, while ethical questions around democracy support are much more complex and contested than normally recognizsed, addressing them can also help this policy agenda.
1.	Technical, Iimplicitly Lliberal, Llocally Oowned Ddemocracy Ssupport, and the Pproblem of Eethics
Although for many philosophers and political theorists, democracy has been a key site of “ethical” debate as to what counts as the good life and how we should treat each other, paradoxically, ethical debate is, pardoxically, not a dominant focus in democracy support today. Rather, the practice of democracy promotion today treats both democracy and its promotion as by and large “technical” agendas. To understand why, a short survey of current policy practice around democracy support is required. I start with a short description of the policy and its evolution and then focus on three core aspects of current practice: its depoliticizsation, its implicit liberalism, and its commitment to local ownership.
Democracy promotion is a wide-ranging policy agenda with a long history. It has its origins in the eighteen18th- and nineteen19th- century anti-imperialist foreign policy of the newly formed United States of America, in the twentie20th- century liberal internationalism of Woodrow Wilson, in the post-war reconstruction efforts in Japan and Germany, and in the “development aid” instruments conceived of in the 1960s (for an excellent history, see Smith, 1994). However, the 1980s and especially the 1990s, were the so-called “gGolden aAge” of democracy promotion. At this time, at the end of the Cold War, not only did many regions of the world ask for assistance in reforming their governance structure, but liberal Western states also found a new confidence (driven no doubt by power considerations) to step into the breach to provide such assistance (see Chapter 37).
In the 1990s the core of the policy revolved around legal and institutional reform, electoral assistance, and some civil society support. The so-called sequencing debate suggested that once certain steps had been taken in democratizsing a country, other steps to consolidate could follow. The policy practices then focused on lining up the steps in the path to democratization. Much has been learned about democratization since, and in response various adjustments have also taken place in democracy promotion. Today it is no longer an agenda driven by “linear” sequencing models, and its policy instruments are very varied. Today, democracy promotion is a multifaceted and multi-pronged policy agenda. While transforming legal structures and political institutions, various levels and types of pressure can be asserted and in various spheres of activity: from the political systems to service provision, economic policy, trade policy and civil society constitution.
A huge range of tools are now used: such as from déemarches and statements, to sanctions and penalties, from funding of electoral monitoring and parliamentary support to institution- building and budget support to ministries, from trade conditionalities to international organization membership conditionalities (such as EU enlargement), from civil society project- funding forto specific political forces to technical assistance and spread of “best governance” practices.” Crucially, today, in any specific country a specific mix of methods, carefully assessed and fitted into context, are deployed. There is no singleular “blue print” but a variegated set of assessments and responses to the needs of specific societies. Which The choice of methods get to be deployed reliesy of course on judgements on what might best work in given contexts but also, importantly, on power-political judgements (see Chapter 43). Indeed, it is important to remember that democracy support is always conducted in the context of considerations of power—even if these are not necessarily the only considerations that are relevant in democracy support, as some realists would argue (for further discussion, see Bridoux and Kurki, 2014:; ch. 3).
HBut how might we characterize the trends in this multi-pronged policy practice today? Three key observations (developed in more detail elsewhere;, see especially Kurki, 2013) are appropriate in regard to the current policy agenda before we can move on to the ethical implications.
First, democracy today is treated as a factual “thing,” and democracy promotion is about the transposition of these technically efficient ways of governing to others globally. As such, crucially, democracy and its promotion, now seem to have nothing self-evidently to do with “ethical” debate about values, what ought to be, or normative questions as to how we should treat each other. Ethical and value-laden statements were in the 1990s characteristic of democracy promotion, but today policy practices today, however varied, tend to assume that democracy is a standard of modern statehood, and that as a result it is self-evident that democracy should be encouraged (see e.g. European Council of European Union , 2015; US State Department, 2015). This is the case partly because “factually” democracy has been observed to create more stability and harmony in international affairs, but also because ethically it is assumed that democracy “is a good thing.”
This factuality of democracy is manifested in the increasingly scientific, instrumental mechanisms for measurement and management of democracy projects. The applicants for civil society funding, for example, today have to jump navigate through a range of management measures through which they can come to identify and then to track the causal effects of their actions. There is a “factish” reality to democracy support today (Kurki, 2016), one which requires ethical and contested political debate around democracy and democracy promotion to be sidestepped in favour of a focus on measuring democracy and creating “accountability” between donors and recipients of aid (see Chapter 34).
Second, at the same time as depoliticizing debate on democracy, there is a tendency for democracy promotion today to be implicitly liberal, or neoliberal, in its foundational assumptions. The democracy sought is a liberal democracy, and the context within which it is to operate is liberal, including economically and in terms of the international organizational arrangements surrounding it. Democracy support is about maintenance of liberal order both within and outside states. What this means is that the fact that democracy promotion or support appears “technical” does not mean it is devoid of value systems or political biases. Indeed, it is the “implicit” liberalism,’ and the fact that it is widely accepted that allows the practice to appear as “neutral.”
The implicit liberalism embedded in democracy support is in part surprising, for, (as has been noted), there have been attempts to adjust policy practices in the field which were once, in the 1990s, firmly and openly liberal. Since the 1990s there have been turns “away from sequencing,” “back to the state,” and opening to “plurality of experiences on democracy.” However, even as this is the case, it appears that at the core of the existing policy practice is simultaneously a deep liberal bias. Recognition of debate, variety, pluralism, or stability of the state are today important, but still within a broadly liberal understanding of the state and the international order.
There is a third trend of importance since the mid-2000s. This is the turn to “local ownership.” This turn is important for a number of reasons. First, it shows signs of recognition of the problems that “top-down” democracy promotion has faced in the past. Second, it is practically significant in having pushed democracy support increasingly towards the civil society and project- funding instruments. Third, it has also been important because, while local ownership is deemed important, it is deemed implementable within a depoliticized and implicitly liberal democracy support project (Abrahamsen, 2004; Kurki, 2011). Whether these three things really are a coherent mix is a question vexing both academics and policy practitioners today: how locally owned can a project be if it is to sit within particular technical, and implicitly liberal, management frames?
The current policy paradigm and practice of democracy support is, as we have seen, multi-faceted, varied in responses, and open to learning. Yet the three trends, taken individually as well as in how they manifest together, are far from unproblematic. Indeed, they give rise to certain practical problems in democracy support today—, for example, around meaningfulness of local ownership, around how to deal with plurality of views on democracy in target countries, and around how to “entice” target groups to work with the “technical” instruments.
Yet, given our concerns, one could suggest that the current policy trends are ultimately problematic because they work to hide an implicit set of ethical commitments. While it is good to seek best practice, fine-hone tune delivery instruments, and measure the effects of democracy support aid, what the current technical approach to democracy support sidesteps is that at its heart both democracy and democracy support are perhaps far from “technical” but rather instead intensely political and ethical notions and practices. The fact that the ethics of democracy or democracy promotion are not currently addressed but sidestepped in policy documents, practices, and practitioner debates is therefore problematic: because no matter how perfect our “science” of democracy promotion and democratization, we also need to recognize the inevitable politics (power relations) and inevitable ethics (value judgements on good life) involved with all engagements with democracy and democracy promotion. WThus, we need to carefully draw out, excavate if you like, the ethics in democracy promotion. As we shall see, this task is potentially more tricky than we tend to believe.
2.	Excavating the Eethics of Ddemocracy Ppromotion
In seeking to gain a sense of the ethics of democracy promotion and how we might think about it, I start by exploring liberal ethics for the practice, moving on to interrogate the implications of more challenging “extra-liberal” ethical frameworks.
2.1	The Vvaried Lliberal Eethics and Ddemocracy Ppromotion
There is no doubt that liberalism provides the core ground for thinking about democracy in the domestic contexts of most, certainly Western, states and also of democracy promotion as a legitimate policy in international politics. Liberalism has a complex and intriguing history;, which we will not delve into it here, but it is worth noting that as an ideological frame it is inextricably tied to a particular social context: the rise of entrepreneurial, republican classes sceptical of authoritarian monarchical rule. Combined with arguments for free trade, the liberals developed notions of representative governance and rule of law which would ensure their representation within the state and, crucially, the stability of their investments against any exercise of arbitrary monarchical will (see e.g. McPherson, 1977 for the history of liberal democracy). What made the proposals for representative government “democratic” was the incremental inclusion of other interests and classes into the idea of representative government. This was a hard-earned “opening up” towards liberal democracy (see e.g. Bowles and Gintis, 1989;7; Rueschemeyer, 1992), but an important one, as the idea of liberal democracy by the 1920s was rather distinct from the elite model of representative government imagined by the early liberals.
This liberal representative “democracy,” as it was (eventually) accepted, became characterized by a universal or nearly universal suffrage, individuals’ representation through representatives chosen in elections, checks and balances between executive and parliament, an independent judiciary, and respect for the equality of citizens’ rights. An open civil society within which freedom of religion and speech were reinforced was to provide a check on representatives and the state to allow for the independent development of the spirit of entrepreneurship.
While premised oin the interest of various classes and also some hard-fought social struggles (by feminists and working classes, for example), the liberal democratic state also emerged as an “ethical” frame within which understandings of moral imperatives of the “good life” were understood. It is these liberal “ethical values” that are considered to be at the heart of democratic thought, practice, and systems today. These values consist of: respect for the autonomy of each reasoning human individual; respect for their right to express their interests and views; representation of their interests and needs in a political system; pluralism of an open society and political system; and maintenance of equality between individuals in politics and also in economic affairs (normally by allowing individual entrepreneurship to be exercised).
TInterestingly, these values have of course also been contested by liberals. Indeed, liberalism and liberal democratic thought is not a singular tradition of thought or practice. An important set of orientations, pushing in somewhat different directions from “classical” liberalism, emerged early on within liberal thought. While classical liberals emphasized negative freedoms, autonomy of the individual, and the separation of powers as well as separation of spheres of the economic and the political, the “social liberal” or “reform liberal” tradition emphasized that core liberal values—equality and autonomy—could not be maintained within a condition of “negative freedom,” but required the active intervention of the state to provide for the “equality of opportunity” between individuals. SThe social liberals argued for active intervention of the state in the economy to ensure that unacceptable inequalities would not arise, and maintained that active encouragement of expression of views by working classes and women, for example, was needed to ensure they were fully represented within government (Hobson, 1909; see also Freeden, 1998).
Although liberalism comes in various permutations, at its core lies, arguably, an ethic of respect for liberal individual autonomy within a limited and rational system of governance, which ensures openness of representation,  and view -formation, and expression. But how does a liberal ethic express itself in relation to the idea of “promoting democracy”?
I have argued above that there is an implicit liberalism present in democracy support. But what we can see is that there is in fact no singular ethics, even within liberal debate, even as there are certain delimiting parameters to such debate.
Historically, there have been important disagreements at the heart of a liberal democratic tradition on ethics of democracy promotion. This was evident in the views of the early American fathers of the first truly liberal democratic public. While Thomas Jefferson, for example, wanted to aggressively make the “ball of liberty” roll over the globe with American assistance, John Quincy Adams was more reluctant. For him, the US should not go “abroad in search of monsters to destroy” but rather should lead the world only by example (for a discussion, see for examplee.g. Bridoux and Kurki, 2014:, 4). This debate between liberals with different orientations to promotion of democracy is still reflected in today’s debates on democracy promotion. Indeed, when it comes to Syria, Ukraine, China, and the Middle East, policy debates revolve around the question of where we should draw the balance between the urge to promote democracy “everywhere” and “anytime” and the need to show respect for the autonomy of others to come to democratic principles on their own.
The more “aggressive” liberal frame, visible today in calls for support to democracy activists in China and Russia, arises from a classical liberal notion, which identifies locates the ethical drive to promotefor liberal democracy promotion in the universal moral law that rights of individuals and of democratic representation apply to all individual humans on this planet. If all individuals have rights, the sovereignty of states can stand in the way of the realization of the ethical good for all (even though, of course, paradoxically it is the “state” that democratizsers want to democratize in defence of rights of individuals). In principle, if all people on earth have a right to democratic governance, out of respect for their autonomy, then this should be promoted by ethically -thinking, consistently practiscing liberals everywhere: Ukraine, Syria, China, and not just the “easy” countries where democracy is called for.
Nevertheless, others argue that the liberal ethics of democracy support cannot be so “easy.” Indeed, a substantial tradition within liberalism, especially but not always tied up with the social liberal tradition, argues that the active promotion of democracy in other societies is not ethically praiseworthy. Respect for thea democratic value of autonomy for them is central. We must then think carefully about democracy links to sovereignty in international politics, and this entails, they argue, the need to consider the rights of states and societies to determine their own system of governance. Aggressive promotion of liberal democracy is considered anti-democratic in spirit: instead, good role models need to be set up in the democratic countries for others to follow willingly. In so far as liberals should do anything, perhaps they could, as many “democracy supporters” today argue, assist in non-interfering ways to fund “locally owned” democracy projects (even though just how non-interfering this mode of intervention is contested by many critics).
Given the range of possible liberal positions on the ethics of democracy promotion, it is no surprise that in practice there are still debates on whether, when, and how democracy promotion should be engaged in between liberals of many hues. In the American scene, for example, the tensions between pro-active and less -active as well as between liberal and reform liberal traditions are still being played out (see Kurki, 2013; Bridoux and Kurki, 20145). At the same time, to maintain an appearance of unity, most policy actors also try to “smooth over the cracks” in how they relate to values of democracy and democracy promotion. Indeed, it is precisely in the context of the persistence of liberal ethical debate in both in the US and the EU that the tendency to try and “depoliticizse” debates on liberal democracy and its promotion emerge: to try to show a consensual face to the funders of activity and to the increasingly sckeptical domestic and international audiences.
The attempts to smooth over of the ethical debates on democracy promotion among different liberal democratic traditions presents some problems—; not least in giving rise to self-contradictory tendencies in democracy promotion between those hoping to defend it on “ethical” or “value” grounds and those seeking to “de-ethicizse” (and depoliticize) it, often for the sake of greater consensus on funding at home and greater acceptance abroad. Many recipients of democracy aid—and even some donors—today are, rightly, confused about what this agenda exactly stands for in terms of values and why.
Yet these challenges are minor when set against the much more significant challenge for this policy agenda today, which is the rise rise to the surface of alternative ways of thinking of both democracy and the ethics of democracy promotion. These alternative approaches pose a challenge to the liberal orientation of both democracy and its global promotion. The following section examines just four such traditions.
2.2	Alternative Mmodels and their Eethics
The history of democracy is not just the history of liberal democracy. Democracy is a concept that has been at the centreer of many different political ideologies and many different political struggles. This is partly why it is one of the first and foremost “contested concepts” in politics (Gallie , 1956). Contestation over democracy arises from different appropriations of the concept, placing it in different conceptual universes in the context of different social struggles. For some, democracy is associated with rights, freedoms, elections; for others, with socio-economic justice, participation, and equality. The different conceptual universes of democracy are of significance because they create different “ethical” frameworks within which the concept has been understood and practisced: what democracy is for, what it entails for the good life, and why it should be adopted.
Here I seek to briefly discuss  four different traditions of democratic thought and how they relate to the question of ethics of democracy promotion: social democracy, radical democracy, global democracy, and post-human democracy.
Social democracy has its roots in a Marxist or socialist critique (see Chapter 49) of the failings of liberal democracy. Much like social liberals, social democrats argue that to achieve “democracy,” a reframing of how democracy should function but also a reframing of its core values is necessary. Social democrats are concerned about placing democracy in the context of equality. For them, however, equality is a socio-economic, not simply a legal, concept. It entails actual socio-economic as well as political equality of individuals in terms of their rights and , representation but also employment and social function. Democracy conceived legally or in terms of political rights is considered “empty”: for democracy to have ethical value in the context of our societies in which power relations structure economic and social relations and not just political relations, a wider conception of democracy is needed. A democratic system requires a “dual” core: equality of rights and representation in the political sphere, but combined with equality of representation and rights in the economic and employment spheres. A different kind of a democratic state than from the liberal democratic state is demanded: , one with substantial state intervention, and crucially one with representation ofby citizens in the sphere of employment law and redistribution, and indeed in the market in the form of co-ownership structures (Tilton, 1990; Berman , 2006).
The ethics of promoting this kind of democracy globally are rather more complex too. While many social democrats believe in the superiority of the social democratic state, and while many party- political actors in Nordic countries have promoted this model in developing countries, and indeed in the West, there is a less, or a different kind, of a universalist drive for democratization present in social democratic tradition. Social democrats tend to want to facilitate democracy elsewhere, but focus not simply on the political system but also on issues of economic equality and labour. At the same time, an ethical critique of liberal universalism also arises from social democracy: the principle of state sovereignty has an important meaning to social democrats: it allows the state to determine its own affairs in defencse of its people’s’ democracy. If sovereignty is a democratic value for these deeply communitarian social democrats, then a breach of sovereign rights in defencse of universal rights is shunned frowned upon. This is why social democrats can be both democracy- promoting in their ethics and at the same time sckeptical of a universalist facilitation of liberal political systems and rights: these can lead to false universalisms which ignore the socio-econonomic context and indeed content of democracy as conceived of by social democrats.
Radical democracy draws inspiration from the participatory democratic movements that have since the 1960s proliferated in many (primarily) liberal or social democratic states. These movements sought to pluralizse the “spheres” of democratic governance in modern states—bringing democratic principles to everyday practices, such as school boards and civic life. Developed originally by the likes of Benjamin Barber (2004) and Carole Pateman (1970), participatory democracy has recently evolved in the writings by Laclau and Mouffe (1985) on radical democracy. Radical democrats argue that democracy is not about liberal rights, universal values, or consensus- building amongst liberal subjects within a rational state. Instead, it is about conflict, about contestation, about a radical pluralism of views not to be “owned” or controlled by a specific ideological tradition. Drawing its inspiration from the rise of new social movements both within and between states, radical democracy does not seek institutionalization, nor does it draw boundaries between states. Rather, it calls for an ethos of agonism, an ethos of contestation and pluralism, in a global setting.
Movements within states but also transnational fora like the World Social Forum, it is suggested, are associated with the workings of radical democratic principles. Here, democracy is a practice of dialogue, contestation, and everyday working out of views amongst diverse groups, without clear procedural guidance, proceedings, or functions. Democracy is radical democracy: open, fluid, contested, multiple.
The international ethics of this way of thinking about democracy are also quite different. There is no drive to universalize democracy, to promote specific models of democracy. Indeed, on this view there is no need to “promote” democracy: it emerges and contests from the ground up where it exists. Democracy is not a blue-print, a model, something which can be controlled, packaged, sold or promoted. It “is” the ethos of pluralism. Democracy promotion here then is not (, indeed cannot be) about, the promotion of a singular model or a practice with a universal moral law behind it. Nor is it about more contextual promotion on the lines of social democrats. Instead, one could say that what is advanced here is an ethical critique of the restriction, or disciplining, of democracy through democracy support which seeks to specify what democracy is. Radical democrats call for the opening up and radicalizing of the pluralistic ethos of speaking and practiscing democracy globally—both in the West and the rest—and in this, “democracy promoters” should have no superior moral role.
Global democracy too comes with challenges to liberal democratic frames. Although it there arehas various forms, ranging from liberal and social democratic globalism to global deliberative democracy, global democrats are agreed upon the notion that if democracy is to have ethical or practical purchase today it needs to be imagined, not within a state-bound ethic, but rather a more cosmopolitan ethic (see Chapter 3). Not only is “state-based” democracy less meaningful in the context of globalization but, crucially, individuals globally do not gain proper representation on matters involving “externalities” decided on in other states. This means that a cosmopolitan global identity and global democratic institutions are needed to develop a form of democracy that can live up to its promise as a concept.
There is a democracy- promoting drive in this framework:; many cosmopolitan or global democrats are indeed at the heart of political struggles to create better, more democratic global institutions, setting forward “covenants” on the basis of which they such institutions could be engendered (Held, 2004). Promoting democracy is also a global aim. Yet their orientation to classical liberal notions of democracy promotion is rather somewhat sceptical. These authors argue that we need to think through economics and , social policy as well as the “political” sphere in order for democratization to take place.
This entails a wide-ranging critique of sovereign and national self-determination as an ethical good as well as a challenge to the universality of a liberal democratic “individual.” The individual to be protected and enabled in global democracy is closer to a global social democratic citizen, and (liberal) democracy promotion is challenged at a fundamental level: it is the (paradoxical) restriction of democracy to the state which makes democracy promotion today not only practically but also morally questionable. Democracy is a cosmopolitan, not sovereign, moral good, and thus should not be promoted in such restricted state-bound frameworks.
Many challenges, conceptually and ethically, arise from these kinds of alternative models of democracy. If these approaches are challenging, let us discuss another, perhaps most challenging to current policy discussions of democracy but one which has a great deal of purchase not only for social theorists but also many social movement activists today. This is what one might call a post-human democracy. Authors such as Donna Harraway (2003) and Bruno Latour (2004), prefigured by Mathews (1995), have been involved in exploration of the meaning of representation and democracy in the context of the non-human. Do animals, plants,  and other even “non-living” (by our standards) creatures or processes have a right of representation? These “others” so far excluded from democracy, could, they argue, be represented either directly or indirectly in decision- making, benefitting from the legal fictions we call rights in equal measure to our more standard “human” bearers of rights.
Within this frame we get perhaps the most wide-ranging critique of both the ethics of liberal democracy and democracy support. Democracy promotion as currently conceived is not just a liberal project benefitting some and ignoring others;, it is also a human project, aimed at protecting and safeguarding the humans on this planet possibly at the expense of the “others” which facilitate our human life. This is not only ethically questionable for post-humanists, it is also far removed from realities of life on this planet, where symbiotic and complex ecosystems maintain life, both human and non-human.
Within this framework we are forced to expose ideological biases of a deep kind in our own conceptions of democracy ideological biases of a deep kind. First, against the hubris of universal rights, we are forced to accept that in reality humans on this planet are humans very unequally;, but also we are also forced to accept that our non-human species -mates also suffer and struggle to survive, like many of our human “equals” (Braidotti, 2013). The issues of representing these populations, these populations “we” are parasitic on, is an intensely ethical and politically important challenge. Yet, it is a challenge that is hardly addressed or contemplated in the universe of liberal assumptions.
Whatever the complications with liberal ethics of democracy promotion, these complications abound when we consider non- and extra-liberal understandings of democracy. What does this mean for democracy promotion today?
3.	Conclusion: Ppromotion of Ddemocracy Rrevisited
To conclude, Llet me offer three conclusions as to what the discussion above might mean. First, democracy we see here is not a “thing” with an agreed upon definition. It does not have one meaning, reality, or end state. It is in perpetual process, crisis, negotiation (see also O’Donnell, 2007). It is contested. This means that the ethics of democracy promotion are also necessarily far more tricky than implied by the current policy frameworkss imply. As implied by the brief survey of the different approaches to democracy and democracy promotion implies, the ethics of democracy and democracy promotion are very much up for contestation and struggle today. In these struggles, those the ones with funds and discursive hegemony tend to win out;, but this does not mean that their definitions of democracy or the ethics of its promotion are or will be universally accepted or reproduced globally. We should not expect this or assume it, but discuss it.
This might, secondly, assist in obtaining more meaningful dialogue around democracy and challenges to it, domestically and internationally, and might offer greater “leverage” (as practitioners would put it) on the ground. We need to reflect on the multiple manifestations of democratic thought and practice, and think seriously about what this means fordemocracy promotion.
In so doing we need, thirdly,  to, third, be wary of what it is that democracy and democracy promotion “do.” This is because it is possible that democracy and democracy promotion do not do what we think they do: promote democracy. Democracy promotion also promotes particular ways of life, for example, liberal entrepreneurial life, consumerist capitalist life, life controlled by “states.” Not only that—, if post-humanists are right, it also promotes “humans” as unique, separable reference points of morality, or ethics. Promoting democracy does much more than have an effect on “democracy”: it also justifies and facilitates ways of life, discourses, power relations between humans, and also, perhaps, power relations to non-humans.
From this perspective, while I will not here call for any one ethical frame (this would be difficult given the trickiness we have encountered), I will call for what surveying multiple frames seems to entail: that we remain more circumspect about all ethical frames, including our “own.” We cannot live without ethics, but perhaps we need to think more carefully just how we debate our ethics and those of others. Indeed, with reflection on the many alternative ethical frames on concerning democracy and its promotion, perhaps we will become just a little more circumspect about: first, those ethical arguments which seek universal moral principles in a universe composed of multiplicity of being; and, second, about our own tendencies to “know” and argue “what is right” even as we are always deeply situated in multiple relations and the relational ethics thereof. Ethical debate is perspectival, contextual, and political as much as it is unavoidable in how we negotiate our relations on this planet and indeed with the planet.
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